“The dinner comes with the position, sir,” says his chief of staff, Col. Charlie Flynn.

McChrystal turns sharply in his chair.

“Hey, Charlie,” he asks, “does this come with the position?”

McChrystal gives him the middle finger.

The general stands and looks around the suite that his traveling staff of 10 has converted into a full-scale operations center. The tables are crowded with silver Panasonic Toughbooks, and blue cables crisscross the hotel’s thick carpet, hooked up to satellite dishes to provide encrypted phone and e-mail communications. Dressed in off-the-rack civilian casual – blue tie, button-down shirt, dress slacks – McChrystal is way out of his comfort zone. Paris, as one of his advisers says, is the “most anti-McChrystal city you can imagine.” The general hates fancy restaurants, rejecting any place with candles on the tables as too “Gucci.” He prefers Bud Light Lime (his favorite beer) to Bordeaux, Talladega Nights (his favorite movie) to Jean-Luc Godard. Besides, the public eye has never been a place where McChrystal felt comfortable: Before President Obama put him in charge of the war in Afghanistan, he spent five years running the Pentagon’s most secretive black ops.

“What’s the update on the Kandahar bombing?” McChrystal asks Flynn. The city has been rocked by two massive car bombs in the past day alone, calling into question the general’s assurances that he can wrest it from the Taliban.

“We have two KIAs, but that hasn’t been confirmed,” Flynn says.

McChrystal takes a final look around the suite. At 55, he is gaunt and lean, not unlike an older version of Christian Bale in Rescue Dawn. His slate-blue eyes have the unsettling ability to drill down when they lock on you. If you’ve fucked up or disappointed him, they can destroy your soul without the need for him to raise his voice.

“I’d rather have my ass kicked by a roomful of people than go out to this dinner,” McChrystal says.

He pauses a beat.

“Unfortunately,” he adds, “no one in this room could do it.”

With that, he’s out the door.

“Who’s he going to dinner with?” I ask one of his aides.

“Some French minister,” the aide tells me. “It’s fucking gay.”

The next morning, McChrystal and his team gather to prepare for a speech he is giving at the École Militaire, a French military academy. The general prides himself on being sharper and ballsier than anyone else, but his brashness comes with a price: Although McChrystal has been in charge of the war for only a year, in that short time he has managed to piss off almost everyone with a stake in the conflict. Last fall, during the question-and-answer session following a speech he gave in London, McChrystal dismissed the counterterrorism strategy being advocated by Vice President Joe Biden as “shortsighted,” saying it would lead to a state of “Chaos-istan.” The remarks earned him a smackdown from the president himself, who summoned the general to a terse private meeting aboard Air Force One. The message to McChrystal seemed clear: Shut the fuck up, and keep a lower profile

Now, flipping through printout cards of his speech in Paris, McChrystal wonders aloud what Biden question he might get today, and how he should respond. “I never know what’s going to pop out until I’m up there, that’s the problem,” he says. Then, unable to help themselves, he and his staff imagine the general dismissing the vice president with a good one-liner.

“Are you asking about Vice President Biden?” McChrystal says with a laugh. “Who’s that?”

“Biden?” suggests a top adviser. “Did you say: Bite Me?”

When Barack Obama entered the Oval Office, he immediately set out to deliver on his most important campaign promise on foreign policy: to refocus the war in Afghanistan on what led us to invade in the first place. “I want the American people to understand,” he announced in March 2009. “We have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” He ordered another 21,000 troops to Kabul, the largest increase since the war began in 2001. Taking the advice of both the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also fired Gen. David McKiernan – then the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan – and replaced him with a man he didn’t know and had met only briefly: Gen. Stanley McChrystal. It was the first time a top general had been relieved from duty during wartime in more than 50 years, since Harry Truman fired Gen. Douglas MacArthur at the height of the Korean War.

Even though he had voted for Obama, McChrystal and his new commander in chief failed from the outset to connect. The general first encountered Obama a week after he took office, when the president met with a dozen senior military officials in a room at the Pentagon known as the Tank. According to sources familiar with the meeting, McChrystal thought Obama looked “uncomfortable and intimidated” by the roomful of military brass. Their first one-on-one meeting took place in the Oval Office four months later, after McChrystal got the Afghanistan job, and it didn’t go much better. “It was a 10-minute photo op,” says an adviser to McChrystal. “Obama clearly didn’t know anything about him, who he was. Here’s the guy who’s going to run his fucking war, but he didn’t seem very engaged. The Boss was pretty disappointed.”

From the start, McChrystal was determined to place his personal stamp on Afghanistan, to use it as a laboratory for a controversial military strategy known as counterinsurgency. COIN, as the theory is known, is the new gospel of the Pentagon brass, a doctrine that attempts to square the military’s preference for high-tech violence with the demands of fighting protracted wars in failed states. COIN calls for sending huge numbers of ground troops to not only destroy the enemy, but to live among the civilian population and slowly rebuild, or build from scratch, another nation’s government – a process that even its staunchest advocates admit requires years, if not decades, to achieve. The theory essentially rebrands the military, expanding its authority (and its funding) to encompass the diplomatic and political sides of warfare: Think the Green Berets as an armed Peace Corps. In 2006, after Gen. David Petraeus beta-tested the theory during his “surge” in Iraq, it quickly gained a hardcore following of think-tankers, journalists, military officers and civilian officials. Nicknamed “COINdinistas” for their cultish zeal, this influential cadre believed the doctrine would be the perfect solution for Afghanistan. All they needed was a general with enough charisma and political savvy to implement it.

As McChrystal leaned on Obama to ramp up the war, he did it with the same fearlessness he used to track down terrorists in Iraq: Figure out how your enemy operates, be faster and more ruthless than everybody else, then take the fuckers out. After arriving in Afghanistan last June, the general conducted his own policy review, ordered up by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The now-infamous report was leaked to the press, and its conclusion was dire: If we didn’t send another 40,000 troops – swelling the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan by nearly half – we were in danger of “mission failure.” The White House was furious. McChrystal, they felt, was trying to bully Obama, opening him up to charges of being weak on national security unless he did what the general wanted. It was Obama versus the Pentagon, and the Pentagon was determined to kick the president’s ass.

Last fall, with his top general calling for more troops, Obama launched a three-month review to re-evaluate the strategy in Afghanistan. “I found that time painful,” McChrystal tells me in one of several lengthy interviews. “I was selling an unsellable position.” For the general, it was a crash course in Beltway politics – a battle that pitted him against experienced Washington insiders like Vice President Biden, who argued that a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan would plunge America into a military quagmire without weakening international terrorist networks. “The entire COIN strategy is a fraud perpetuated on the American people,” says Douglas Macgregor, a retired colonel and leading critic of counterinsurgency who attended West Point with McChrystal. “The idea that we are going to spend a trillion dollars to reshape the culture of the Islamic world is utter nonsense.

In the end, however, McChrystal got almost exactly what he wanted. On December 1st, in a speech at West Point, the president laid out all the reasons why fighting the war in Afghanistan is a bad idea: It’s expensive; we’re in an economic crisis; a decade-long commitment would sap American power; Al Qaeda has shifted its base of operations to Pakistan. Then, without ever using the words “victory” or “win,” Obama announced that he would send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, almost as many as McChrystal had requested. The president had thrown his weight, however hesitantly, behind the counterinsurgency crowd.

Today, as McChrystal gears up for an offensive in southern Afghanistan, the prospects for any kind of success look bleak. In June, the death toll for U.S. troops passed 1,000, and the number of IEDs has doubled. Spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the fifth-poorest country on earth has failed to win over the civilian population, whose attitude toward U.S. troops ranges from intensely wary to openly hostile. The biggest military operation of the year – a ferocious offensive that began in February to retake the southern town of Marja – continues to drag on, prompting McChrystal himself to refer to it as a “bleeding ulcer.” In June, Afghanistan officially outpaced Vietnam as the longest war in American history – and Obama has quietly begun to back away from the deadline he set for withdrawing U.S. troops in July of next year. The president finds himself stuck in something even more insane than a quagmire: a quagmire he knowingly walked into, even though it’s precisely the kind of gigantic, mind-numbing, multigenerational nation-building project he explicitly said he didn’t want.

Even those who support McChrystal and his strategy of counterinsurgency know that whatever the general manages to accomplish in Afghanistan, it’s going to look more like Vietnam than Desert Storm. “It’s not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win,” says Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville, who serves as chief of operations for McChrystal. “This is going to end in an argument.”

The night after his speech in Paris, McChrystal and his staff head to Kitty O’Shea’s, an Irish pub catering to tourists, around the corner from the hotel. His wife, Annie, has joined him for a rare visit: Since the Iraq War began in 2003, she has seen her husband less than 30 days a year. Though it is his and Annie’s 33rd wedding anniversary, McChrystal has invited his inner circle along for dinner and drinks at the “least Gucci” place his staff could find. His wife isn’t surprised. “He once took me to a Jack in the Box when I was dressed in formalwear,” she says with a laugh.

The general’s staff is a handpicked collection of killers, spies, geniuses, patriots, political operators and outright maniacs. There’s a former head of British Special Forces, two Navy Seals, an Afghan Special Forces commando, a lawyer, two fighter pilots and at least two dozen combat veterans and counterinsurgency experts. They jokingly refer to themselves as Team America, taking the name from the South Park-esque sendup of military cluelessness, and they pride themselves on their can-do attitude and their disdain for authority. After arriving in Kabul last summer, Team America set about changing the culture of the International Security Assistance Force, as the NATO-led mission is known. (U.S. soldiers had taken to deriding ISAF as short for “I Suck at Fighting” or “In Sandals and Flip-Flops.”) McChrystal banned alcohol on base, kicked out Burger King and other symbols of American excess, expanded the morning briefing to include thousands of officers and refashioned the command center into a Situational Awareness Room, a free-flowing information hub modeled after Mayor Mike Bloomberg’s offices in New York. He also set a manic pace for his staff, becoming legendary for sleeping four hours a night, running seven miles each morning, and eating one meal a day. (In the month I spend around the general, I witness him eating only once.) It’s a kind of superhuman narrative that has built up around him, a staple in almost every media profile, as if the ability to go without sleep and food translates into the possibility of a man single-handedly winning the war.

By midnight at Kitty O’Shea’s, much of Team America is completely shitfaced. Two officers do an Irish jig mixed with steps from a traditional Afghan wedding dance, while McChrystal’s top advisers lock arms and sing a slurred song of their own invention. “Afghanistan!” they bellow. “Afghanistan!” They call it their Afghanistan song.

McChrystal steps away from the circle, observing his team. “All these men,” he tells me. “I’d die for them. And they’d die for me.”

The assembled men may look and sound like a bunch of combat veterans letting off steam, but in fact this tight-knit group represents the most powerful force shaping U.S. policy in Afghanistan. While McChrystal and his men are in indisputable command of all military aspects of the war, there is no equivalent position on the diplomatic or political side. Instead, an assortment of administration players compete over the Afghan portfolio: U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Special Representative to Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke, National Security Advisor Jim Jones and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, not to mention 40 or so other coalition ambassadors and a host of talking heads who try to insert themselves into the mess, from John Kerry to John McCain. This diplomatic incoherence has effectively allowed McChrystal’s team to call the shots and hampered efforts to build a stable and credible government in Afghanistan. “It jeopardizes the mission,” says Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who supports McChrystal. “The military cannot by itself create governance reform.”

Part of the problem is structural: The Defense Department budget exceeds $600 billion a year, while the State Department receives only $50 billion. But part of the problem is personal: In private, Team McChrystal likes to talk shit about many of Obama’s top people on the diplomatic side. One aide calls Jim Jones, a retired four-star general and veteran of the Cold War, a “clown” who remains “stuck in 1985.” Politicians like McCain and Kerry, says another aide, “turn up, have a meeting with Karzai, criticize him at the airport press conference, then get back for the Sunday talk shows. Frankly, it’s not very helpful.” Only Hillary Clinton receives good reviews from McChrystal’s inner circle. “Hillary had Stan’s back during the strategic review,” says an adviser. “She said, ‘If Stan wants it, give him what he needs.’?”

McChrystal reserves special skepticism for Holbrooke, the official in charge of reintegrating the Taliban. “The Boss says he’s like a wounded animal,” says a member of the general’s team. “Holbrooke keeps hearing rumors that he’s going to get fired, so that makes him dangerous. He’s a brilliant guy, but he just comes in, pulls on a lever, whatever he can grasp onto. But this is COIN, and you can’t just have someone yanking on shit.”

Michael Hastings at the ISAF base in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Photograph by Mikhail Galustov for RollingStone/Redux

At one point on his trip to Paris, McChrystal checks his BlackBerry. “Oh, not another e-mail from Holbrooke,” he groans. “I don’t even want to open it.” He clicks on the message and reads the salutation out loud, then stuffs the BlackBerry back in his pocket, not bothering to conceal his annoyance.

“Make sure you don’t get any of that on your leg,” an aide jokes, referring to the e-mail.

By far the most crucial – and strained – relationship is between McChrystal and Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador. According to those close to the two men, Eikenberry – a retired three-star general who served in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2005 – can’t stand that his former subordinate is now calling the shots. He’s also furious that McChrystal, backed by NATO’s allies, refused to put Eikenberry in the pivotal role of viceroy in Afghanistan, which would have made him the diplomatic equivalent of the general. The job instead went to British Ambassador Mark Sedwill – a move that effectively increased McChrystal’s influence over diplomacy by shutting out a powerful rival. “In reality, that position needs to be filled by an American for it to have weight,” says a U.S. official familiar with the negotiations.

The relationship was further strained in January, when a classified cable that Eikenberry wrote was leaked to The New York Times. The cable was as scathing as it was prescient. The ambassador offered a brutal critique of McChrystal’s strategy, dismissed President Hamid Karzai as “not an adequate strategic partner,” and cast doubt on whether the counterinsurgency plan would be “sufficient” to deal with Al Qaeda. “We will become more deeply engaged here with no way to extricate ourselves,” Eikenberry warned, “short of allowing the country to descend again into lawlessness and chaos.”

McChrystal and his team were blindsided by the cable. “I like Karl, I’ve known him for years, but they’d never said anything like that to us before,” says McChrystal, who adds that he felt “betrayed” by the leak. “Here’s one that covers his flank for the history books. Now if we fail, they can say, ‘I told you so.’?”

The most striking example of McChrystal’s usurpation of diplomatic policy is his handling of Karzai. It is McChrystal, not diplomats like Eikenberry or Holbrooke, who enjoys the best relationship with the man America is relying on to lead Afghanistan. The doctrine of counterinsurgency requires a credible government, and since Karzai is not considered credible by his own people, McChrystal has worked hard to make him so. Over the past few months, he has accompanied the president on more than 10 trips around the country, standing beside him at political meetings, or shuras, in Kandahar. In February, the day before the doomed offensive in Marja, McChrystal even drove over to the president’s palace to get him to sign off on what would be the largest military operation of the year. Karzai’s staff, however, insisted that the president was sleeping off a cold and could not be disturbed. After several hours of haggling, McChrystal finally enlisted the aid of Afghanistan’s defense minister, who persuaded Karzai’s people to wake the president from his nap.

This is one of the central flaws with McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy: The need to build a credible government puts us at the mercy of whatever tin-pot leader we’ve backed – a danger that Eikenberry explicitly warned about in his cable. Even Team McChrystal privately acknowledges that Karzai is a less-than-ideal partner. “He’s been locked up in his palace the past year,” laments one of the general’s top advisers. At times, Karzai himself has actively undermined McChrystal’s desire to put him in charge. During a recent visit to Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Karzai met three U.S. soldiers who had been wounded in Uruzgan province. “General,” he called out to McChrystal, “I didn’t even know we were fighting in Uruzgan!”

Growing up as a military brat, McChrystal exhibited the mixture of brilliance and cockiness that would follow him throughout his career. His father fought in Korea and Vietnam, retiring as a two-star general, and his four brothers all joined the armed services. Moving around to different bases, McChrystal took solace in baseball, a sport in which he made no pretense of hiding his superiority: In Little League, he would call out strikes to the crowd before whipping a fastball down the middle.

McChrystal entered West Point in 1972, when the U.S. military was close to its all-time low in popularity. His class was the last to graduate before the academy started to admit women. The “Prison on the Hudson,” as it was known then, was a potent mix of testosterone, hooliganism and reactionary patriotism. Cadets repeatedly trashed the mess hall in food fights, and birthdays were celebrated with a tradition called “rat fucking,” which often left the birthday boy outside in the snow or mud, covered in shaving cream. “It was pretty out of control,” says Lt. Gen. David Barno, a classmate who went on to serve as the top commander in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005. The class, filled with what Barno calls “huge talent” and “wild-eyed teenagers with a strong sense of idealism,” also produced Gen. Ray Odierno, the current commander of U.S. forces in Iraq.

The son of a general, McChrystal was also a ringleader of the campus dissidents – a dual role that taught him how to thrive in a rigid, top-down environment while thumbing his nose at authority every chance he got. He accumulated more than 100 hours of demerits for drinking, partying and insubordination – a record that his classmates boasted made him a “century man.” One classmate, who asked not to be named, recalls finding McChrystal passed out in the shower after downing a case of beer he had hidden under the sink. The troublemaking almost got him kicked out, and he spent hours subjected to forced marches in the Area, a paved courtyard where unruly cadets were disciplined. “I’d come visit, and I’d end up spending most of my time in the library, while Stan was in the Area,” recalls Annie, who began dating McChrystal in 1973.

McChrystal wound up ranking 298 out of a class of 855, a serious underachievement for a man widely regarded as brilliant. His most compelling work was extracurricular: As managing editor of The Pointer, the West Point literary magazine, McChrystal wrote seven short stories that eerily foreshadow many of the issues he would confront in his career. In one tale, a fictional officer complains about the difficulty of training foreign troops to fight; in another, a 19-year-old soldier kills a boy he mistakes for a terrorist. In “Brinkman’s Note,” a piece of suspense fiction, the unnamed narrator appears to be trying to stop a plot to assassinate the president. It turns out, however, that the narrator himself is the assassin, and he’s able to infiltrate the White House: “The President strode in smiling. From the right coat pocket of the raincoat I carried, I slowly drew forth my 32-caliber pistol. In Brinkman’s failure, I had succeeded.”

After graduation, 2nd Lt. Stanley McChrystal entered an Army that was all but broken in the wake of Vietnam. “We really felt we were a peacetime generation,” he recalls. “There was the Gulf War, but even that didn’t feel like that big of a deal.” So McChrystal spent his career where the action was: He enrolled in Special Forces school and became a regimental commander of the 3rd Ranger Battalion in 1986. It was a dangerous position, even in peacetime – nearly two dozen Rangers were killed in training accidents during the Eighties. It was also an unorthodox career path: Most soldiers who want to climb the ranks to general don’t go into the Rangers. Displaying a penchant for transforming systems he considers outdated, McChrystal set out to revolutionize the training regime for the Rangers. He introduced mixed martial arts, required every soldier to qualify with night-vision goggles on the rifle range and forced troops to build up their endurance with weekly marches involving heavy backpacks.

In the late 1990s, McChrystal shrewdly improved his inside game, spending a year at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and then at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he co-authored a treatise on the merits and drawbacks of humanitarian interventionism. But as he moved up through the ranks, McChrystal relied on the skills he had learned as a troublemaking kid at West Point: knowing precisely how far he could go in a rigid military hierarchy without getting tossed out. Being a highly intelligent badass, he discovered, could take you far – especially in the political chaos that followed September 11th. “He was very focused,” says Annie. “Even as a young officer he seemed to know what he wanted to do. I don’t think his personality has changed in all these years.”

By some accounts, McChrystal’s career should have been over at least two times by now. As Pentagon spokesman during the invasion of Iraq, the general seemed more like a White House mouthpiece than an up-and-coming commander with a reputation for speaking his mind. When Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made his infamous “stuff happens” remark during the looting of Baghdad, McChrystal backed him up. A few days later, he echoed the president’s Mission Accomplished gaffe by insisting that major combat operations in Iraq were over. But it was during his next stint – overseeing the military’s most elite units, including the Rangers, Navy Seals and Delta Force – that McChrystal took part in a cover-up that would have destroyed the career of a lesser man.

After Cpl. Pat Tillman, the former-NFL-star-turned-Ranger, was accidentally killed by his own troops in Afghanistan in April 2004, McChrystal took an active role in creating the impression that Tillman had died at the hands of Taliban fighters. He signed off on a falsified recommendation for a Silver Star that suggested Tillman had been killed by enemy fire. (McChrystal would later claim he didn’t read the recommendation closely enough – a strange excuse for a commander known for his laserlike attention to minute details.) A week later, McChrystal sent a memo up the chain of command, specifically warning that President Bush should avoid mentioning the cause of Tillman’s death. “If the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death become public,” he wrote, it could cause “public embarrassment” for the president.

“The false narrative, which McChrystal clearly helped construct, diminished Pat’s true actions,” wrote Tillman’s mother, Mary, in her book Boots on the Ground by Dusk. McChrystal got away with it, she added, because he was the “golden boy” of Rumsfeld and Bush, who loved his willingness to get things done, even if it included bending the rules or skipping the chain of command. Nine days after Tillman’s death, McChrystal was promoted to major general.

Two years later, in 2006, McChrystal was tainted by a scandal involving detainee abuse and torture at Camp Nama in Iraq. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, prisoners at the camp were subjected to a now-familiar litany of abuse: stress positions, being dragged naked through the mud. McChrystal was not disciplined in the scandal, even though an interrogator at the camp reported seeing him inspect the prison multiple times. But the experience was so unsettling to McChrystal that he tried to prevent detainee operations from being placed under his command in Afghanistan, viewing them as a “political swamp,” according to a U.S. official. In May 2009, as McChrystal prepared for his confirmation hearings, his staff prepared him for hard questions about Camp Nama and the Tillman cover-up. But the scandals barely made a ripple in Congress, and McChrystal was soon on his way back to Kabul to run the war in Afghanistan.

The media, to a large extent, have also given McChrystal a pass on both controversies. Where Gen. Petraeus is kind of a dweeb, a teacher’s pet with a Ranger’s tab, McChrystal is a snake-eating rebel, a “Jedi” commander, as Newsweek called him. He didn’t care when his teenage son came home with blue hair and a mohawk. He speaks his mind with a candor rare for a high-ranking official. He asks for opinions, and seems genuinely interested in the response. He gets briefings on his iPod and listens to books on tape. He carries a custom-made set of nunchucks in his convoy engraved with his name and four stars, and his itinerary often bears a fresh quote from Bruce Lee. (“There are no limits. There are only plateaus, and you must not stay there, you must go beyond them.”) He went out on dozens of nighttime raids during his time in Iraq, unprecedented for a top commander, and turned up on missions unannounced, with almost no entourage. “The fucking lads love Stan McChrystal,” says a British officer who serves in Kabul. “You’d be out in Somewhere, Iraq, and someone would take a knee beside you, and a corporal would be like ‘Who the fuck is that?’ And it’s fucking Stan McChrystal.”

It doesn’t hurt that McChrystal was also extremely successful as head of the Joint Special Operations Command, the elite forces that carry out the government’s darkest ops. During the Iraq surge, his team killed and captured thousands of insurgents, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. “JSOC was a killing machine,” says Maj. Gen. Mayville, his chief of operations. McChrystal was also open to new ways of killing. He systematically mapped out terrorist networks, targeting specific insurgents and hunting them down – often with the help of cyberfreaks traditionally shunned by the military. “The Boss would find the 24-year-old kid with a nose ring, with some fucking brilliant degree from MIT, sitting in the corner with 16 computer monitors humming,” says a Special Forces commando who worked with McChrystal in Iraq and now serves on his staff in Kabul. “He’d say, ‘Hey – you fucking muscleheads couldn’t find lunch without help. You got to work together with these guys.’?”

Even in his new role as America’s leading evangelist for counterinsurgency, McChrystal retains the deep-seated instincts of a terrorist hunter. To put pressure on the Taliban, he has upped the number of Special Forces units in Afghanistan from four to 19. “You better be out there hitting four or five targets tonight,” McChrystal will tell a Navy Seal he sees in the hallway at headquarters. Then he’ll add, “I’m going to have to scold you in the morning for it, though.” In fact, the general frequently finds himself apologizing for the disastrous consequences of counterinsurgency. In the first four months of this year, NATO forces killed some 90 civilians, up 76 percent from the same period in 2009 – a record that has created tremendous resentment among the very population that COIN theory is intent on winning over. In February, a Special Forces night raid ended in the deaths of two pregnant Afghan women and allegations of a cover-up, and in April, protests erupted in Kandahar after U.S. forces accidentally shot up a bus, killing five Afghans. “We’ve shot an amazing number of people,” McChrystal recently conceded.

Despite the tragedies and miscues, McChrystal has issued some of the strictest directives to avoid civilian casualties that the U.S. military has ever encountered in a war zone. It’s “insurgent math,” as he calls it – for every innocent person you kill, you create 10 new enemies. He has ordered convoys to curtail their reckless driving, put restrictions on the use of air power and severely limited night raids. He regularly apologizes to Hamid Karzai when civilians are killed, and berates commanders responsible for civilian deaths. “For a while,” says one U.S. official, “the most dangerous place to be in Afghanistan was in front of McChrystal after a ‘civ cas’ incident.” The ISAF command has even discussed ways to make not killing into something you can win an award for: There’s talk of creating a new medal for “courageous restraint,” a buzzword that’s unlikely to gain much traction in the gung-ho culture of the U.S. military.

But however strategic they may be, McChrystal’s new marching orders have caused an intense backlash among his own troops. Being told to hold their fire, soldiers complain, puts them in greater danger. “Bottom line?” says a former Special Forces operator who has spent years in Iraq and Afghanistan. “I would love to kick McChrystal in the nuts. His rules of engagement put soldiers’ lives in even greater danger. Every real soldier will tell you the same thing.”

In March, McChrystal traveled to Combat Outpost JFM – a small encampment on the outskirts of Kandahar – to confront such accusations from the troops directly. It was a typically bold move by the general. Only two days earlier, he had received an e-mail from Israel Arroyo, a 25-year-old staff sergeant who asked McChrystal to go on a mission with his unit. “I am writing because it was said you don’t care about the troops and have made it harder to defend ourselves,” Arroyo wrote.

Within hours, McChrystal responded personally: “I’m saddened by the accusation that I don’t care about soldiers, as it is something I suspect any soldier takes both personally and professionally – at least I do. But I know perceptions depend upon your perspective at the time, and I respect that every soldier’s view is his own.” Then he showed up at Arroyo’s outpost and went on a foot patrol with the troops – not some bullshit photo-op stroll through a market, but a real live operation in a dangerous war zone.

Six weeks later, just before McChrystal returned from Paris, the general received another e-mail from Arroyo. A 23-year-old corporal named Michael Ingram – one of the soldiers McChrystal had gone on patrol with – had been killed by an IED a day earlier. It was the third man the 25-member platoon had lost in a year, and Arroyo was writing to see if the general would attend Ingram’s memorial service. “He started to look up to you,” Arroyo wrote. McChrystal said he would try to make it down to pay his respects as soon as possible.

The night before the general is scheduled to visit Sgt. Arroyo’s platoon for the memorial, I arrive at Combat Outpost JFM to speak with the soldiers he had gone on patrol with. JFM is a small encampment, ringed by high blast walls and guard towers. Almost all of the soldiers here have been on repeated combat tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and have seen some of the worst fighting of both wars. But they are especially angered by Ingram’s death. His commanders had repeatedly requested permission to tear down the house where Ingram was killed, noting that it was often used as a combat position by the Taliban. But due to McChrystal’s new restrictions to avoid upsetting civilians, the request had been denied. “These were abandoned houses,” fumes Staff Sgt. Kennith Hicks. “Nobody was coming back to live in them.”

One soldier shows me the list of new regulations the platoon was given. “Patrol only in areas that you are reasonably certain that you will not have to defend yourselves with lethal force,” the laminated card reads. For a soldier who has traveled halfway around the world to fight, that’s like telling a cop he should only patrol in areas where he knows he won’t have to make arrests. “Does that make any fucking sense?” asks Pfc. Jared Pautsch. “We should just drop a fucking bomb on this place. You sit and ask yourself: What are we doing here?”

The rules handed out here are not what McChrystal intended – they’ve been distorted as they passed through the chain of command – but knowing that does nothing to lessen the anger of troops on the ground. “Fuck, when I came over here and heard that McChrystal was in charge, I thought we would get our fucking gun on,” says Hicks, who has served three tours of combat. “I get COIN. I get all that. McChrystal comes here, explains it, it makes sense. But then he goes away on his bird, and by the time his directives get passed down to us through Big Army, they’re all fucked up – either because somebody is trying to cover their ass, or because they just don’t understand it themselves. But we’re fucking losing this thing.”

McChrystal and his team show up the next day. Underneath a tent, the general has a 45-minute discussion with some two dozen soldiers. The atmosphere is tense. “I ask you what’s going on in your world, and I think it’s important for you all to understand the big picture as well,” McChrystal begins. “How’s the company doing? You guys feeling sorry for yourselves? Anybody? Anybody feel like you’re losing?” McChrystal says.

“Sir, some of the guys here, sir, think we’re losing, sir,” says Hicks.

McChrystal nods. “Strength is leading when you just don’t want to lead,” he tells the men. “You’re leading by example. That’s what we do. Particularly when it’s really, really hard, and it hurts inside.” Then he spends 20 minutes talking about counterinsurgency, diagramming his concepts and principles on a whiteboard. He makes COIN seem like common sense, but he’s careful not to bullshit the men. “We are knee-deep in the decisive year,” he tells them. The Taliban, he insists, no longer has the initiative – “but I don’t think we do, either.” It’s similar to the talk he gave in Paris, but it’s not winning any hearts and minds among the soldiers. “This is the philosophical part that works with think tanks,” McChrystal tries to joke. “But it doesn’t get the same reception from infantry companies.”

During the question-and-answer period, the frustration boils over. The soldiers complain about not being allowed to use lethal force, about watching insurgents they detain be freed for lack of evidence. They want to be able to fight – like they did in Iraq, like they had in Afghanistan before McChrystal. “We aren’t putting fear into the Taliban,” one soldier says.

“Winning hearts and minds in COIN is a coldblooded thing,” McChrystal says, citing an oft-repeated maxim that you can’t kill your way out of Afghanistan. “The Russians killed 1 million Afghans, and that didn’t work.”

“I’m not saying go out and kill everybody, sir,” the soldier persists. “You say we’ve stopped the momentum of the insurgency. I don’t believe that’s true in this area. The more we pull back, the more we restrain ourselves, the stronger it’s getting.”

“I agree with you,” McChrystal says. “In this area, we’ve not made progress, probably. You have to show strength here, you have to use fire. What I’m telling you is, fire costs you. What do you want to do? You want to wipe the population out here and resettle it?”

A soldier complains that under the rules, any insurgent who doesn’t have a weapon is immediately assumed to be a civilian. “That’s the way this game is,” McChrystal says. “It’s complex. I can’t just decide: It’s shirts and skins, and we’ll kill all the shirts.”

As the discussion ends, McChrystal seems to sense that he hasn’t succeeded at easing the men’s anger. He makes one last-ditch effort to reach them, acknowledging the death of Cpl. Ingram. “There’s no way I can make that easier,” he tells them. “No way I can pretend it won’t hurt. No way I can tell you not to feel that. . . . I will tell you, you’re doing a great job. Don’t let the frustration get to you.” The session ends with no clapping, and no real resolution. McChrystal may have sold President Obama on counterinsurgency, but many of his own men aren’t buying it.

When it comes to Afghanistan, history is not on McChrystal’s side. The only foreign invader to have any success here was Genghis Khan – and he wasn’t hampered by things like human rights, economic development and press scrutiny. The COIN doctrine, bizarrely, draws inspiration from some of the biggest Western military embarrassments in recent memory: France’s nasty war in Algeria (lost in 1962) and the American misadventure in Vietnam (lost in 1975). McChrystal, like other advocates of COIN, readily acknowledges that counterinsurgency campaigns are inherently messy, expensive and easy to lose. “Even Afghans are confused by Afghanistan,” he says. But even if he somehow manages to succeed, after years of bloody fighting with Afghan kids who pose no threat to the U.S. homeland, the war will do little to shut down Al Qaeda, which has shifted its operations to Pakistan. Dispatching 150,000 troops to build new schools, roads, mosques and water-treatment facilities around Kandahar is like trying to stop the drug war in Mexico by occupying Arkansas and building Baptist churches in Little Rock. “It’s all very cynical, politically,” says Marc Sageman, a former CIA case officer who has extensive experience in the region. “Afghanistan is not in our vital interest – there’s nothing for us there.”

In mid-May, two weeks after visiting the troops in Kandahar, McChrystal travels to the White House for a high-level visit by Hamid Karzai. It is a triumphant moment for the general, one that demonstrates he is very much in command – both in Kabul and in Washington. In the East Room, which is packed with journalists and dignitaries, President Obama sings the praises of Karzai. The two leaders talk about how great their relationship is, about the pain they feel over civilian casualties. They mention the word “progress” 16 times in under an hour. But there is no mention of victory. Still, the session represents the most forceful commitment that Obama has made to McChrystal’s strategy in months. “There is no denying the progress that the Afghan people have made in recent years – in education, in health care and economic development,” the president says. “As I saw in the lights across Kabul when I landed – lights that would not have been visible just a few years earlier.”

It is a disconcerting observation for Obama to make. During the worst years in Iraq, when the Bush administration had no real progress to point to, officials used to offer up the exact same evidence of success. “It was one of our first impressions,” one GOP official said in 2006, after landing in Baghdad at the height of the sectarian violence. “So many lights shining brightly.” So it is to the language of the Iraq War that the Obama administration has turned – talk of progress, of city lights, of metrics like health care and education. Rhetoric that just a few years ago they would have mocked. “They are trying to manipulate perceptions because there is no definition of victory – because victory is not even defined or recognizable,” says Celeste Ward, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation who served as a political adviser to U.S. commanders in Iraq in 2006. “That’s the game we’re in right now. What we need, for strategic purposes, is to create the perception that we didn’t get run off. The facts on the ground are not great, and are not going to become great in the near future.”

But facts on the ground, as history has proven, offer little deterrent to a military determined to stay the course. Even those closest to McChrystal know that the rising anti-war sentiment at home doesn’t begin to reflect how deeply fucked up things are in Afghanistan. “If Americans pulled back and started paying attention to this war, it would become even less popular,” a senior adviser to McChrystal says. Such realism, however, doesn’t prevent advocates of counterinsurgency from dreaming big: Instead of beginning to withdraw troops next year, as Obama promised, the military hopes to ramp up its counterinsurgency campaign even further. “There’s a possibility we could ask for another surge of U.S. forces next summer if we see success here,” a senior military official in Kabul tells me.

Back in Afghanistan, less than a month after the White House meeting with Karzai and all the talk of “progress,” McChrystal is hit by the biggest blow to his vision of counterinsurgency. Since last year, the Pentagon had been planning to launch a major military operation this summer in Kandahar, the country’s second-largest city and the Taliban’s original home base. It was supposed to be a decisive turning point in the war – the primary reason for the troop surge that McChrystal wrested from Obama late last year. But on June 10th, acknowledging that the military still needs to lay more groundwork, the general announced that he is postponing the offensive until the fall. Rather than one big battle, like Fallujah or Ramadi, U.S. troops will implement what McChrystal calls a “rising tide of security.” The Afghan police and army will enter Kandahar to attempt to seize control of neighborhoods, while the U.S. pours $90 million of aid into the city to win over the civilian population.

Even proponents of counterinsurgency are hard-pressed to explain the new plan. “This isn’t a classic operation,” says a U.S. military official. “It’s not going to be Black Hawk Down. There aren’t going to be doors kicked in.” Other U.S. officials insist that doors are going to be kicked in, but that it’s going to be a kinder, gentler offensive than the disaster in Marja. “The Taliban have a jackboot on the city,” says a military official. “We have to remove them, but we have to do it in a way that doesn’t alienate the population.” When Vice President Biden was briefed on the new plan in the Oval Office, insiders say he was shocked to see how much it mirrored the more gradual plan of counterterrorism that he advocated last fall. “This looks like CT-plus!” he said, according to U.S. officials familiar with the meeting.

Whatever the nature of the new plan, the delay underscores the fundamental flaws of counterinsurgency. After nine years of war, the Taliban simply remains too strongly entrenched for the U.S. military to openly attack. The very people that COIN seeks to win over – the Afghan people – do not want us there. Our supposed ally, President Karzai, used his influence to delay the offensive, and the massive influx of aid championed by McChrystal is likely only to make things worse. “Throwing money at the problem exacerbates the problem,” says Andrew Wilder, an expert at Tufts University who has studied the effect of aid in southern Afghanistan. “A tsunami of cash fuels corruption, delegitimizes the government and creates an environment where we’re picking winners and losers” – a process that fuels resentment and hostility among the civilian population. So far, counterinsurgency has succeeded only in creating a never-ending demand for the primary product supplied by the military: perpetual war. There is a reason that President Obama studiously avoids using the word “victory” when he talks about Afghanistan. Winning, it would seem, is not really possible. Not even with Stanley McChrystal in charge.

Reprinted without permission (for archival purposes). Original Story Here

By  Michael Hastings

Jun 22, 2010 10:00 AM EDT

This article appears in RS 1108/1109 from July 8-22, 2010, on newsstands Friday, June 25.

Primary players in the planning and coordination included the Combined Arms Center, the Army G3/5/7, the Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center, and the United Kingdom Land Warfare Center. The Battle Command Battle Laboratory-Leavenworth, in coordination with the UK-LWC and TRAC, collaboratively planned, prepared and executed TS/OF10 experiment distributively from Fort Leavenworth; Warminster, U.K.; Fort Benning, Ga.; Fort Gordon, Ga.; Fort Monroe, Va.; Redstone Arsenal, Ala.; and Fort Bliss, Texas.

The experiment, by design, enabled an assessment of operating capabilities between U.S. and U.K. units in the current timeframe and then transitioned to a future environment  with the introduction of emerging technologies and their effect on operations. More than 600 U.S. and U.K. soldiers, civilians and contractors were required to support this experiment from multiple locations. At Fort Leavenworth, more than 250 personnel were required to replicate the coalition joint forces land component command and division command posts and provide analyst support.

During the first two weeks of the event, training and orientation was provided both locally and distributively. This training allowed the new personnel to participate in team building activities that oriented them to their roles and functions, scenario, road to war and command and control system training that included the Command Post of the Future and other U.K. and U.S. battle command systems in use today. Mini exercises and tactical vignettes finalized the training to allow the command post personnel to exercise and practice the staff procedures they would be performing.

The third week was the Talon Strike portion of the event that involved using current force equipment and technology as the experimentation baseline. Talon Strike was co-sponsored by the Department of the Army and the U.K. Chief of Staff (Land Forces) and endorsed by the U.K.-U.S. Army Staff Talks. It also served as a train-up for the 12th U.K. Brigade’s anticipated deployment to Afghanistan.

The fourth and final week of the event was the Omni Fusion 2010 portion using 2017 future force battle command concepts and equipment. This allowed Army concept developers to explore emerging concepts related to the human dimensions of mission command within the context of division, joint and multinational operations. It also allowed exploration of how interagency and intergovernmental elements are integrated into the operation.

To have a successful experiment, BCBL worked closely with the United Kingdom Land Warfare Centre. A close working relationship was developed between the Combined Arms Center’s BCBL and a significant number of organizations, people, cultures and armies.

Col. Mark Forman, deputy director for the BCBL, praised for the entire endeavor.

“During the planning and preparation activities over the past year, the BCBL overcame a ‘surge’s’ impact on our operational force, an earthquake in Haiti that drew a back-up division … and interagency participation, a volcano that redirected/delayed/blocked some participation, as well as multiple bureaucratic hurdles and the inevitable digital ‘friction,’” Forman said. “Yet, a great team of professionals from organizations throughout TRADOC and across the globe pulled this off in an extremely professional and successful manner. This enabled an increased understanding of each other’s forces capabilities and procedures.”

Col. Crispian Beattie, the U.K. co-experiment director, provided positive feedback on the complex technical aspects of the event.

“A few technical issues related to the U.K.’s transition during OF10, to the Common Battlefield Application Toolset versus the existing systems and multiple entries coming from the U.S. multinational inter-operability programs gateway; however, these issues have been resolved, or significantly improved, with minimal impact on the event,” Beattie said.

During the event, both the LWC and BCBL-L hosted showcase days and invited leaders from throughout each respective Army to visit the facilities and observe the experiment.  BCBL hosted representatives from the Combined Arms Center’s Future Force Integration Directorate, U.K. Land Warfare Development Group, TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center’s Joint and Army Experimentation Division, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, U.S. Air Force’s Research Laboratory, Joint Forces Command, and the British Defence Staff. Videoteleconferences between the U.S. and U.K. co-experiment directors and both groups of VIPs to exchange of questions and ideas. Questions and discussions focused on the need for continued events like TS/OF10, feedback on emerging digital application efforts, host nation security forces’ future use of command and control systems and handheld devices, and lessons learned associated with TS/OF10.

The event ended May 21 with a collaborative brief via videoteleconference to the CAC commander and all participants, and recognition of those who contributed significantly to the great success of the event.

“TS/OF10 was a highly successful, multinational combined exercise and experiment, said Tom Jordan, CAC CDID director. “A genuine and effective partnership was developed between the Combined Arms Center, TRADOC Analysis Center, and U.K. Land Warfare Centre. This partnership contributed to the overall success of the event.  TS/OF10 provided a high return on the substantial resources invested by the U.S. and U.K. armies.”

By Jack Burkett

Note: Jack Burkett if the deputy chief of the Battle Command Battle Laboratory’s Experimentation Branch.

Defense firm Cubic announced yesterday that it had won a $4.8 million contract to supply 27 COMBATREDI systems to the Florida Army National Guard, along with four Warrior Skills Trainers, a vehicle simulator that works with COMBATREDI. It’s the first sale of COMBATREDI, which the company rolled out at a simulation and training conference last December. (Cubic isn’t the only company in the business: The Army has teamed up with outfits like the Institute for Creative Technologies in Los Angeles to tap gaming technology; Army Training and Doctrine Command even has its own video game unit.)

As opposed to many skills trainers, COMBATREDI is a tetherless, user-worn system. The set is built around a high-definition, helmet-mounted OLED video display with an integrated 3D stereo headset; the user also carries a wireless, scoped sim rifle that requires magazine swap-outs and fire selection.

According to a company news release, the system is supposed to boost realism by allowing trainees to actually move around in the virtual environment. Compared with the Army’s Engagement Skills Trainer, which teaches soldiers on “shoot/don’t shoot” scenarios, it seems to be something of a step ahead: The EST, also made by Cubic, is built around a high-resolution projector that shows trainees images on a large fixed screen. That’s more like training on a traditional range; the new system is a bit more like going through a shoot house.

The image shown after the jump is from the COMBATREDI virtual reality environment. The Warrior Skills Trainer, a projector-based system, puts users through scenarios from the military’s Virtual Battlespace 2 training system.

Called the M134D Virtual Trainer, the simulator is modeled after the M134D Minigun, a six-barrel electric-powered machine gun that fires 7.62mm rifle rounds. Its high-rate of fire — up to 50 rounds per second — makes the M134D exceptionally effective at suppressing hostile forces in a wide variety of combat situations. The same characteristic, however, also is a major drawback because training personnel to use the M134D with live rounds is incredibly expensive.

“You are talking a dollar a round, and you are shooting 3,000 rounds a minute,” said Tony Padgett, Product Line Immersion Training Manager for the Cubic Simulation Systems Division in Orlando.

Cubic’s trainer recreates the ballistics of an actual M134D in a virtual training environment as well as weapon sounds and other characteristics. Two of the simulators are scheduled to be delivered to Department of Energy facilities, where they will be used for facility protection and counterterrorism training along with Cubic’s Warrior Skills Trainer (WST), a virtual vehicle trainer that uses high-fidelity graphics projected on large screens for training scenarios. A third M134D virtual trainer will go to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, as part of a mobile Cubic training system being used to train U.S. Army special forces units.

Cubic Corporation is the parent company of three major business segments: Defense Systems, Mission Support Services and Transportation Systems. Cubic Defense Systems is a leading provider of realistic combat training systems and defense electronics. Mission Support Services is a leading provider of training, operations, maintenance, technical and other support services. Cubic Transportation Systems is the world’s leading provider of automated fare collection systems and services for public transit authorities. For more information about Cubic, see the company’s Web site at www.cubic.com.

TRADOC’s National Simulation Center and the U.S. Army Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO STRI) hosted the VBS2 Government Users’ Conference at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash. The event allows VBS2 users and developers to share best practices with the rest of the community, attend tutorials on VBS2 and two other game-based training tools (Bilateral Negotiation and Tactical Language), and communicate with other members of the gaming community of practice.

VBS2 is a commercial game-based training platform that blends a user-friendly, immersive environment with scenario editors, after-action review and a powerful development suite. To help train company and smaller units, the U.S. Army fielded the first-person shooter software and hardware to more than 50 Active, Reserve and National Guard Battle Command Training Centers (BCTC), TRADOC institutions and other selected locations. VBS2 provides a platform for training Soldiers on multiple tasks and mission rehearsal.

Presenters at the conference will include representatives from Centers of Excellence at Fort Knox, Ky. and Fort Sill, Okla.; BCTCs at Fort Lewis, Wash., Fort Hood, Texas, and U.S. Army Europe; and the U.S. Marine Corps.

The speakers discussed innovative uses of VBS2 for training in operational units and at academic institutions. The conference also included demonstrations of scenario and terrain development techniques as well as system interoperability, opportunities to exchange ideas and training insights. Additionally, Col. Paul E. Funk II, deputy commander of the Combined Arms Center-Training, discussed the future of Army gaming and how it will help Soldiers adapt to changing requirements.

Anyone interested in using VBS2 to support training or gaming was invited to attend. They included contractors, industry representatives and foreign military representatives sponsored by PEO STRI or TCM Gaming. Fort Lewis communications personnel also provided an opportunity to participate through Defense Connect Online.

The VBS2 Government Users’ Conference was a follow-up to a Gaming Kaizen meeting held in early December at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. At that idea-sharing event, gaming users and trainers from the Army, Marine Corps, Army Reserve and other organizations discussed ideas for enhancing the use of VBS2 as a training tool and the planned rollout of VBS2 Lite, a modified version of VBS2 that Soldiers will be able to download and use anywhere. The new software, which will be discussed at the conference, is expected to be available later this year to government users. VBS2 Lite is intended to allow Soldiers to become familiar with VBS2 training capabilities and controls, as well as allow several Soldiers to train small-unit tactics simultaneously by connecting computers together via LAN.

Based at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., the Combined Arms Center-Training delivers training programs, products and services to leaders and units in support of Army readiness to conduct full-spectrum operations in any environment. To learn more about the Combined Arms Center-Training, visit http://www.leavenworth.army.mil, or visit them on Facebook and Twitter.

Headquartered in Orlando, Fla., the U.S. Army PEO STRI executes an annual budget of more than $3 billion. In addition to providing interoperable training and testing solutions and program management, PEO STRI provides life cycle support for the Army’s most advanced training systems around the world. PEO STRI is dedicated to putting the power of simulation into the hands of our warfighters.

Contributing to this article:
Diane R. Walker (Combined Arms Center-Training), Anderson Lail (Applied Studies Group)

Realistic tactical simulations are beginning to proliferate, but the developers focus on simulation fidelity not on training. If used in a training context, the simulations are employed as a substitute for the live ’sandbox’. Basic data is collected and diagnostic evaluation is conducted by human observers. On the other hand, the training community has been developing intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) that can perform the key functions of a live tutor/coach. An excellent opportunity exists to couple an intelligent tutor with realistic simulations to provide supplemental training to the CTC experience.

Proposed Solution

The Virtual Combat Training Center (V-CTC) will develop an intelligent tutoring system that is plug-compatible with existing PC-based simulations. Evaluation of student actions is performed by a combination of deductive and Bayesian reasoning, not fixed decision trees. Thus the tutor has an expert level, active knowledge of domain concepts, rules and solutions and develops a rich model of what the student knows and does not know. The student model is continually updated, and influences the tutor’s strategies so that it customizes interactions and instruction to the individual student.

The tutor is hooked into an existing simulation, using software connectors, rather than extensively modifying simulations or building new ones from scratch. This approach will be demonstrated with an existing high-fidelity tactical simulation of combined-arms warfare at the battalion and company level (Armored Task Force). The tutor system is a modular to allow re-use of key components for other applications. In particular, the separation of tutor and simulation, the use of software connectors, and a software architecture approach where the tutor knowledge bases are built from reusable ontologies should all enhance portability, extensibility, and reusability.

Expected Benefits

The proposed approach will provide improved training effectiveness and cost reduction. Improved training effectiveness is due to a richer student state model, more customized tutorial interactions, and more realistic training in simulations. This improved training complements existing CTCs by providing advance training before rotation, refresher training after rotation, and greater time on task outside the CTC. System cost reductions will be due to reusable ITS components and plug-in connectors to existing and future simulations, thus leveraging millions of dollars of development cost.

The Need and Opportunity

Army training in most FORSCOM units revolves around preparing for and participating in Combat Training Centers (CTC). At these centers, the troops fight against intelligent, experienced live opponents using equipment and tactics of enemy forces. The CTCs provide invaluable live training opportunities, however these training experiences are limited due to their availability and expense. For example, in a typical National Training Center (NTC) rotation, there is only enough time to practice two to three missions on offense and on defense. According to some estimates, it costs one million dollars a day for a brigade to train at NTC. Commanders are often reassigned to new positions after a CTC rotation, leaving the new commander of the unit to learn anew what his departing predescessor had just learned.

Due to these limited resources, it is critical that the training experiences at these CTCs be optimized. The benefits of these live training experiences can be extended by providing low-cost, readily available, realistic, and relevant PC-based training prior to CTC rotations to better use the time there, and subsequent to rotations, to enhance retention and allow for in-unit follow-on training that builds on what has just been learned. This supplemental training also allows much greater time on task, allowing trainees to spend more time developing a wider range and more in-depth tactical skills and increased automaticity in applying those skills.

Simulations and games that apply to Defense needs are beginning to proliferate, some from the DoD and from entertainment. These developers are usually domain experts who do not have the interest or resources to add significant training (if any) to their simulations. If the simulations are used in a training context, they are typically employed in a similar manner as the live training centers. Basic aggregate data (e.g., number of kills) is collected and diagnostic evaluation is conducted by human observers — a reduction in equipment cost of CTCs, but still requiring observer personnel. High-end workstation simulations such as JANUS, may also require additional personnel to operate the interfaces for trainees.

A segment of the technical training community focuses on development of intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) that can perform the key functions of a live tutor/coach. These tutoring systems tend to be handcrafted for each application and are expensive and time consuming to build when so developed. The members of this community are not ususally subject matter experts in military subject matter so any simulations developed by them tend to be rather low-fidelity by comparison to those developed by military subject matter experts.

We see an excellent opportunity to couple intelligent tutoring systems technology with existing subject-matter developed high-fidelity simulations to provide supplemental training to the CTC experience.

Proposed Solution

The Virtual Combat Training Center (V-CTC) is an intelligent tutoring system that is plug-compatible with existing PC-based simulations through the use of software connectors. The tutor increases the level of knowledge and expertise that commanders acquire. It does this by promoting expert ways of thinking. It teaches the leader to model the battlefield in his mind, analyze the situation against doctrine, and make doctrinally sound decisions, and rehearse these skills in a variety of situations until they become automatic.

This approach will be demonstrated with an existing high-fidelity tactical simulation of combined-arms warfare at the battalion and company level, called Armored Task Force (ATF). The predecessor to ATF, Brigade Combat Team (BCT), has been used at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Leader Training Program (LTP). The tutoring system will be developed so that the main components (student model, domain knowledge, and tutor strategies) are reusable for other simulations. The tutor component is also intentionally designed as a separate component to existing simulations to promote its reusability.

Tutoring System. Most computer-based tutoring systems build student models based on recognition-based exercises, such as multiple-choice, drag-and-drop, and fill-in-the-blank exercises. While these types of measures are easily collected, they do not provide a full assessment of student state. Not only is it important to have knowledge about a domain, but one must also be able to apply those skills necessary to perform the tasks and do so with confidence. This tutoring system will build a skills and knowledge student model within the context of realistic scenarios and simulations. The V-CTC builds a skills and knowledge student model within the context of realistic scenarios, such as CTC exercises, and in the context of task performance in these high-fidelity simulations.

The tutor provides a real-time assessment of student state that is richer than current approaches. It includes performance-based measures of actions and choices during a realistic simulation, as well as knowledge-based measures of student plans, perceptions (e.g., of enemy threat), and explanations for actions taken or not taken. A dialog capability between the trainee and simulated instructor also provides a rich source of user modeling information, in addition to allowing the trainee to directly ask and answer questions in a natural way. The data collected includes latency and self-assessment measures that provide information for a model of confidence. A Bayesian analysis takes these various measures and forms a student state model consisting of knowledge, skills, and confidence.

Evaluation of student actions in the simulation is performed by deductive reasoning. This knowledge-based reasoning is supported by a domain knowledge representation which is a domain specific knowledge base built over domain-specific ontologies ultimately backed by a standard upper ontology. The ontologies provide a high-level organization of the knowledge, and furthers the user model’s extensibility and reusability. The domain-specific knowledge base provide the tutor with an expert level of active knowledge of domain concepts and rules and solutions. The student state model is continually updated, and influences the tutor’s strategies so that it customizes interactions to the individual student.

The tutor system will be hooked into an existing high-fidelity tactical simulation, using software connectors, rather than either extensively modifying simulations or building new ones from scratch. These hooks into the simulations allow the tutor to control basic operations of the simulation, such as starting, freezing, or replaying particular scenarios at specified points in time. They will allow the tutor opportunities to gather input from the student and provide feedback and explanations.

The tutoring system will be designed with a generic, modular architecture to enable re-use of the key components for other applications. Re-usable components include the student state model, tutoring strategies, domain knowledge representation, and the methodology for connecting the tutor and simulation. We also build the tutor separate from the simulations to allow reuse of each in multiple applications.

Simulation. The Virtual Combat Training Center concept will be demonstrated with a high-fidelity tactical simulation of combined-arms warfare at the battalion and company level, called Armored Task Force (ATF).

ATF is the recently released successor to a previous simulation called Brigade Combat Team (BCT). BCT was an innovation in that it provided most of the fidelity of JANUS (a simulation used extensively at the Command and General Staff College) but eliminated the need for high-end workstations or controllers to interpret commands. BCT included detailed scenarios from NTC training rotations, and combat situations from the first Gulf War to hypothetical engagements in Kuwait, North Korea, and Cuba. Brigade Combat Team has been used for training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Leader Training Program. ATF and BCT were developed by an active duty Army artillery officer, who is an observer/controller at NTC, and was previously stationed at JRTC.

The ATF game pits a friendly force of up to battalion/company size against an enemy force of up to brigade/regimental size against each other in simulated combat. ATF allows a user to take the role of the friendly forces while it plays the opposing force (OPFOR). It randomly selects from multiple enemy course of actions (COAs) stored with each scenario. The user manipulates NATO-standard icons that represent companies, platoons, or sections. Commands can be given from the company-level on down to the platoon-level and specify paths and orders for individual vehicles. Just as in modern land warfare, the user fights with and against units consisting of a wide variety of assets. These include armor, infantry, artillery, engineers, air defense, and aircraft. These units must be synchronized and massed at the key point on the battlefield to win. The cybernetic battlefield is a digitized elevation map of actual terrain and uses UTM coordinates. Actual National Training Center (NTC) maps (e.g., of Crash Hill) are used in the NTC scenarios.

ATF includes scenarios from National Training Center, the Fulda Gap in Europe, the first Gulf War and a hypothetical second Gulf War. It improves on BCT by providing a better simulation of military command since missions can now be assigned to companies and platoons and they will carry out their orders independently. ATF also includes more accurate vehicle and turret modeling, better modeling of weather effects, the addition of civilians, the addition of vehicle smoke capabilities, and an improved user interface and graphics. The maps are not hexes, but continuous terrain features including trees, buildings, and roads in contour-map representations.

BCT and ATF are real-time simulations (1X, 2X, 4X, or 8X of battle real-time) of combined arms warfare. Note that this real-time aspect is very important in helping trainees acquire an intuitive feel of how fast the battlefield changes and in learning how to synchronize different battle operating systems such as artillery and armor.

Operational concept. The Virtual Combat Training Center (V-CTC) could be used for individual development in the unit prior/after CTC rotations. The tutoring component emulates an Observer/Controller (O/C) at NTC. The virtual coach ‘pops-up’ and points out poor tactical decisions as they are being made, teaching Army doctrine at that time. Later, in the After-Action Reviews, the virtual coach summarizes what the commander did wrong and what he should have done.

The V-CTC and simulation can be used in the classroom to illustrate tactical concepts. It can be used to train commanders in different echelons and for networked team training for different roles such as FSO, S-2, and S-3.

Expected Benefits

The Combat Training Centers (CTCs) provide invaluable live training opportunities, however these training experiences are limited due to their availability and expense. Providing relevant training with high fidelity simulations before and after CTC rotations can benefit live training experiences and enhance retention. It is only through the use of simulations that trainees can acquire the hundreds to thousands of hours of training that is required to developed expertise without incurring the time, expense, and risk inherent in live training and real combat.

Intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) coupled with high fidelity simulations can provide this supplemental training. ITS provide individualized instruction with the potential 2 sigma (standard deviation) improvement that good human tutors can accomplish.

We expect that the proposed Virtual Combat Training Center will provide the following advantages and benefits:

Improved quality of training

• With richer student model to inform tutor strategies
• With tutor strategies adaptive to the individual
• With more realistic simulation-based training

Reduced cost of training

• With re-usable ITS components
• By leveraging the millions of development dollars for PC-based simulations
• By providing advance and refresher training to supplement live training exercises

Low-cost training available anywhere and anytime

• Inexpensive platform and software
• Runs on a lap-top PC (lightweight, compact and portable)
• Requires no special peripherals (just a keyboard and mouse)
• Works well in remote and noisy environments as the primary interface is visual, not auditory

A high-fidelity simulated task environment coupled with an intelligent training system with a rich student state model is a vast improvement over current computer-based training programs. This new approach can transform military training by providing continuously available, on-demand mission-level training for all forces at all echelons.

“It tells you everything. The computer calculates time, space and distance to the second. On every shot fired, there’s feedback. And all it costs is electricity,” Graziano said.

One of only six EST facilities in the Army, Fort Bragg’s EST has been open for five years, said Graziano. Each setup can accommodate up to 10 Soldiers, who employ computer-connected weapons.

The difference between EST and video game: realism

As real-life combat scenarios play a screen before them, the Soldiers’ reactions are collected and analyzed by the computer for review. Depending on what the Soldiers do or don’t do, the computer adjusts the scenario.

What separates the EST from first-person shooter video games is its realism, said Graziano. Every weapon used in the EST is a real weapon that has been modified, rather than a replica. The action, recoil and feel of the weapons are no different than they would be on the range, he said.

Soldiers using the EST are not limited to firing only M-4s or M-16s. The facility has versions of virtually every weapon system used by the Army, Graziano said.

“If they’ve got it in the arms room, we’ve got it here,” he said.

Each “round” that the weapons fire at the screen is actually a laser beam that is tracked and analyzed by the EST computer. If the round hits one of the enemy fighters on the screen, the computer adjusts the scenario to show that he has been wounded or killed.

Paratroopers from 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, trained on the EST April 19.

Inside one of the dark rooms, Sgt. 1st Class Donel Hagelin monitored the computer while five Paratroopers got into position on the firing lanes. Hagelin commanded them to lock and load.

On screen, a white van came to a halt at the end of a sandy, desert road. Two unarmed men dismounted and began yelling in Arabic. Then, from the back of the van, two additional men ran out with AK-47s. Instantly, the Paratroopers unleashed a hail of simulated bullets at the screen. In seconds, it was all over.

During the replay, it became clear that one of the Paratroopers had shot at the unarmed men running away. Hagelin corrected him on the spot.

“Situational awareness, men – I can’t stress that enough. That’s something you’re going to have to live with if you kill someone who is just caught in the crossfire,” he said.

After running through several more scenarios, Hagelin was enthusiastic about the value of the EST. The simulator allowed him to give precise feedback to his Paratroopers, and gave them a chance to work on their techniques without having to waste rounds at the range, he said.

“It’s the fastest way to train troops and the easiest way to save money,” he said.

Fortunately I didn’t get a scratch though, as contrary to the rumour going round the office I haven’t signed up for a tour of duty with a mercenary company – I’ve been taking part in these real-world conflicts on my PC using VBS2.

Virtual Battlespace 2, or VBS2 to its friends, is a battlefield simulator developed by Bohemia Interactive Australia, the sister company of Bohemia Interactive, the developers of Operation Flashpoint and Arma: Armed Assault. However, although OFP and Arma are a good deal more realistic than most games, I’d hesitate to describe VBS2 as a game.

VBS2 is based on the same graphics engine as the game Arma: Assault Assault.

For starters, up until a couple of months ago you had to be a government organisation with a multi-million dollar IT budget such as the US Marine Corps or the British Ministry of Defence to even buy a copy of VBS2. That all changed recently though, as BIA decided it was okay to sell a version of VBS2 direct to consumers. At £275, VBS2 Personal Edition is still a lot more expensive than a typical PC game, but being the sort of person who enjoys arguing the merits of the seven different marks of Sten gun, I thought it worth taking for a spin.

Apart from the eye-watering price a number of things quickly become apparent when you try VBS2 for the first time. For starters, because even the cut-down Personal Edition version includes so many different units and maps it’s supplied on two DVDs. Secondly, like some professional graphics applications VBS2 PE is supplied with a USB dongle. This comes in a variety of colours, depending on the length and type of license you have purchased and prevents the simulation from loading without it being inserted in a USB port.

My first experience of VBS2 PE didn’t get off to particularly good start. Like most gamers I’m used to clicking on the game icon in the Start menu and then diving in. With VBS 2 PE however the default icon loads a ‘rights limited’ version of the simulation. In this mode you can’t adjust any of the graphics or audio settings, let alone remap any of the controls. I suppose this is to stop squaddies messing around with the computers they run VBS2 on, but VBS2 PE is the first ‘game’ I can think of with such a limitation. A quick visit to the manual suggested trying clicking on the Administrator mode icon – which treats you like a responsible adult and unlocks all the menus.

The next hurdle is trying to find something to ‘play’. Unlike other games, even non-linear games such as Team Fortress 2, which include a lot of pre-made missions or levels, VBS2 PE is surprisingly sparse. The main menu provides several options, but none are really conducive to jumping in and playing. There are a couple of training scenarios, but these are only really designed to get you used to the default controls as you navigate your avatar through an assault course.

The best menu to try is the Library – which allows you to view in 3D all the units and objects included in VBS2 PE. These vary from the insanely detailed; such as 13 different models of Warrior MICV, to the more mundane; four different breeds of dog, a tractor and a concrete mixing truck, just to name a few. The Library also allows you jump in and control any of these objects, setting you a number of different challenges, from the bizarre; racing a Challenger 2 MBT around a track, to the humdrum: shooting up a collection of trucks in your Apache attack helicopter.

The plethora of sea, air and land (both pedestrian and vehicles) units is one of the biggest differences between VBS2 PE and most games. Although VBS PE doesn’t simulate aircraft as well as Flight Sim X or boats as well as Ship Simulator it provides enough realism for soldiers from various military disciplines to train together in one giant virtual environment. This networking is hugely important, as one of the most crucial parts of training is teaching soldiers to work together as a unit. A virtual battlefield simulator such as VBS2 is thus immensely useful, as it allows soldiers to train to work together without much of the cost, or risk of training out in the field.

You too can walk the streets of Baghdad and get shot at by guerillas if you want. Just be careful not to shoot any civlians.

Unless you have downloaded some user-made missions from one of the several end-user accessible VBS2 forums such as Razors Edge, you’ll need to make a mission of your own to play. This can be done in the Mission Editor, which allows you to create hugely detailed scenarios with full control of the environment including the date, time and weather. In addition to simply plonking down units onto the map you can also script them to behave in a certain way, for example to wait in ambush or patrol a certain area. If works in much the same way as the scenario editor included in Bohemia Interactive’s games, but has many more options.

You can easily make your own missions in VBS2 – in this case a recreation of the Iranian Embassy siege of 1980.

The final part of VBS2 is the After Action Review, which acts much like the ‘instant replay’ feature found in the TV coverage of sporting events, allowing you to view what just happened in the game world. While this provides limited amusement for gamers, for the military it’s a key feature, as it allows instructors to show the troops where they went wrong after the battle so that they learn from the experience.

Although, on the surface, VBS2 plays like pretty much any first person shooter/driving/flying game it soon becomes apparent that this is no game at all. For example, while mainstream PC games have been slow to introduce a limitation on the amount of weapons and ammo your avatar can carry around, VBS2 has a sophisticated inventory system that takes into account the weight and volume of items. No more carrying around four rifles, half a dozen rockets and a crate full of ammo then.

VBS2 is also very uncompromising when it comes to the level of difficulty. Although it’s far easier to aim and shoot with the mouse than it is to aim and fire a real assault rifle, staying alive in VBS2 is still a real challenge – the 21st century battlefield is positively crammed with sharp bits of metal flying through the air at high-speed with your name on them. While you can slow down and accelerate time if you’re fighting a single-player battle, in multiplayer missions you can’t tweak the laws of physics to help you out in this way.

As VBS2 was first made available to government users in April 2007, it doesn’t have the best looking 3D engine. Still, although its graphics are several light years ahead of traditional military simulators, such as the British Army’s £400 million Combined Arms Tactical Trainer built by Lockheed Martin, it’s no Crysis. Still, the maps in Crysis are typically no more than 6,400 hectares, barely enough for a fast moving aircraft to turn around, compared to VBS2’s up to one million hectare maps.

The graphics in a traditional military simulator, such as the British Army’s CATT are truly atrocious by PC game standards.

As a gamer however, even one with a strong interest in military history, VBS2 has one principal fault – it’s not much fun. This is no doubt in part due to the tiny user community – VBS2 is only really worth playing online with other people, and at £275 precious few gamers have bought VBS2.

It can be hugely rewarding to complete a tough and realistic mission, but when you can get a very similar experience from a heavily modded version of Arma for £24.99, VBS2 PE suddenly isn’t a very attractive proposition, even for a hardened military geek such as myself.

Perhaps if the developers had decided to sell VBS2 PE sooner, then it would have given more time for the price to trickle down to a more acceptable level and allow the modding community longer to get to sink its teeth into the engine’s huge potential. After all, out of the box Arma suffers from many of the same problems as VBS2 PE – but most of issues have been addressed by an extremely active modding community.

Ultimately, while VBS2 is undoubtedly a fantastic training tool, and a huge leap forward in graphical fidelity from proprietary military simulators, for gamers, VBS2 PE is an interesting but costly distraction from Arma II.

by James Gorbold or bit-tech.net

The annual demonstration, Empire Challenge (EC), conducted by USJFCOM and its partners on behalf of the under secretary of Defense for intelligence (USD(I)), focuses on providing ISR support to warfighters. Empire Challenge participants include the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and NATO.

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